University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
FOUNDED 1852

________________

Formerly
American Law Register
________________________
VOL. 157

MAY 2009

NO. 5

ARTICLE
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
†

LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & ASSAF HAMDANI

††

Researchers and shareholder advisers have devoted much attention to developing metrics for assessing the governance of public companies around the
world. These important and influential efforts, we argue, suffer from a basic
shortcoming. The impact of many key governance arrangements depends considerably on companies’ ownership structure: measures that protect outside in-

†

William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law
School.
††
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. For their
helpful comments, we would like to thank Allen Ferrell, Jesse Fried, Ron Harris,
Eugene Kandel, Andrew Metrick, Richard Painter, Alain Pietrancosta, Mark Roe, Andrei Shleifer, Holger Spamann, Leo Strine, and participants in the seminar on corporate and securities law policy at Harvard Law School, the law and economics workshop
at Hebrew University, and the Sloan Foundation corporate governance research conference. We also wish to thank Maya Shaton and Carmit Suliman for valuable research
assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Harvard Law
School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business and the Harvard Law
School Program on Corporate Governance.

(1263)

1264

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1263

vestors in a company without a controlling shareholder are often irrelevant or
even harmful when it comes to investor protection in companies with a controlling shareholder, and vice versa. Consequently, governance metrics that purport to apply to companies regardless of ownership structure are bound to miss
the mark with respect to one or both types of firms. In particular, we show that
the influential metrics used extensively by scholars and shareholder advisers to
assess governance arrangements around the world—the Corporate Governance
Quotient (CGQ), the Anti-Director Rights Index, and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index—are inadequate for this purpose.
We argue that, going forward, the quest for global governance standards
should be replaced by an effort to develop and implement separate methodologies
for assessing governance in companies with and without a controlling shareholder. We also identify the key features that these separate methodologies
should include and discuss how to apply such methodologies in either countrylevel or firm-level comparisons. Our analysis has wide-ranging implications for
corporate-governance research and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Researchers, investors, and policymakers around the world have
1
been focusing increasingly on corporate governance. There is now
widespread recognition that adequate investor protection can substan2
tially affect not only the value of public firms and their performance
but also the development of capital markets and the growth of the
3
economy as a whole. This view has naturally led to heightened interest in identifying and bringing about corporate-governance improve4
ments at both firm- and countrywide levels.
These developments also have sparked substantial demand for reliable metrics for evaluating the quality of corporate governance in
5
public firms. Such metrics can facilitate research on corporate governance, inform investment decisions by institutional investors, and
guide efforts to improve governance by both private and public decision makers. Both academic researchers and shareholder advisers
6
have made considerable efforts to develop such metrics. These met1

See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Development, 21 WORLD BANK
RES. OBSERVER 91, 91 (2006) (“Corporate governance . . . has now become a mainstream concern—a staple of discussion in corporate boardrooms, academic meetings,
and policy circles around the globe.” (italics omitted)); Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90, 94 (2008)
(“Over the last decade, a series of important empirical articles have evaluated the impact of many levers of corporate governance on firm value and performance.”).
2
See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 264-69 (2008) (reporting a correlation between various measures
of corporate governance and firms’ operating performance); Bernard S. Black et al.,
Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 366, 410-11 (2006) (reporting evidence that corporate governance is an important factor in predicting the market value of Korean firms).
3
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131, 1139 (1997) (finding evidence that the quality of investor protection affects the
size and breadth of capital markets across countries); Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and
Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 24 (1999) (finding that legal systems that
protect outsiders can aid economic growth).
4
See Stuart L. Gillan, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview, 12 J.
CORP. FIN. 381, 381 (2006) (“The amount of corporate governance research has increased dramatically during the last decade.”).
5
See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008) (“[A] market for corporate governance ratings exists,
with proxy-advising firms . . . using ratings to formulate voting recommendations and
other governance-rating providers using them to advise on investment decisions.”).
6
For recent reviews of efforts by shareholder-advisory firms to provide commercial
governance-ranking services, see id. at 1824-26; Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings:
How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings? 8-14 ( John M. Olin Program in Law &
Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 360, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1152093.
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rics in turn have been used by more than one hundred academic studies, have been extensively utilized by practitioners, and have had a
7
large impact on corporate-governance research and practice.
The notion of a single set of criteria to evaluate the governance of
firms around the world is undoubtedly appealing. Both investors and
public firms are, after all, operating in increasingly integrated global
capital markets. This Article argues, however, that the quest for a single, global governance metric is misguided.
The incidence of controlled and widely held firms varies consid8
erably around the world. In the United States and the United King9
dom, most public companies do not have a controlling shareholder.
10
In most other countries, companies with a controller dominate. The
literature has recognized the fundamental differences both in the nature of the agency problems underlying controlled and widely held
11
firms and in the means for addressing these problems. But the criti7

See Bhagat et al., supra note 5. In Part I, we review the impact of academic and
commercial efforts to develop governance-ranking systems.
8
For purposes of this Article, we define a controlling shareholder as one who
owns or controls sufficient votes to effectively determine vote outcomes and influence
corporate decision making. Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (defining domination as “direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with
the wishes or interests of [those] doing the controlling” (quoting Kaplan v. Centex
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971))), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
9
See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 49193 (1999) (stating that most firms in the United States and United Kingdom are widely
held). But see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1), available at http://
rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/hhm069v1.pdf (“The ownership of U.S. firms is
similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in
other countries.”). Our analysis holds even if U.S. companies with controlling shareholders are more prevalent than previously thought.
10
See Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2000) (“[M]ore than two-thirds of [East Asian] firms
are controlled by a single shareholder.”); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate
Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 (2002) (reporting
that only around thirty-seven percent of Western European firms are widely held);
Thomas Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant, Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in
Europe 4 (CEP Discussion Paper No. 0631, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=616201 (finding that firms in continental Europe are dominated by concentrated ownership). Moreover, in many countries around the world, public firms are
owned through pyramids or other forms of business groups. See generally Tarun
Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?, 45 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 331 (2007) (describing a variety of ownership structures and their
prominence throughout the world).
11
For works discussing differences between the agency problems in widely held
and controlled companies, see, for example, Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate
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cal implications of these differences have not been adequately re12
flected in either the design or the use of governance metrics.
Because the fundamental governance problems of controlled and
widely held firms differ significantly, the effect of many governance
arrangements critically hinges on whether the company has a controlling shareholder. Arrangements that enhance investor protection in
companies without a controlling shareholder are often inconsequential—or even detrimental—to outside investors in companies with a
controlling shareholder, and vice versa. As a result, as we explain in
this Article, governance-rating methodologies that use a single metric
for assessing investor protection worldwide, at either the firm or the
country level, are likely to produce an inaccurate or even distorted
picture. Indeed, we demonstrate that this is the case with respect to
the most influential and widely used global governance metrics.
Academics and practitioners, we argue, should abandon the effort
to develop a single governance metric. Rather, they would do better
to develop separate methodologies for assessing the governance of
companies with and without a controlling shareholder. Such a twotrack approach would best serve researchers, investors, and policymakers in assessing investor protection at either the country level or
the firm level. We further identify the key features that these separate
methodologies should have, thereby providing the necessary framework for developing and applying a new approach for assessing corporate governance around the world.
Our analysis has wide-ranging implications for corporategovernance research and practice. Among other things, it indicates
that researchers may need to reexamine the findings of the large
number of academic studies based on existing global governance metrics and reevaluate the governance ratings currently used by institutional investors and shareholder advisers. Furthermore, our analysis

Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785
(2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 21 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); Howell E.
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based
Evidence, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2009); Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371 (Claude Ménard &
Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
12
But see Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 122-123 (2002) (noting that the OECD principles of
corporate governance focus on the problems underlying widely-held firms).
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provides an approach that can facilitate and improve future governance assessments by researchers and practitioners.
We begin in Part I with an overview of the quest for global governance standards and the most influential global governance metrics.
Among academics, the most influential effort has been made by a
team of financial economists who put forward successively two indices
for measuring countries’ level of investor protection, the Anti-Director
13
Rights Index and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index. These indices have
been applied by more than one hundred academic studies and have
14
had considerable influence on corporate-governance research.
Among practitioners, the most influential effort to date has been
RiskMetrics’s Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) system for rat15
ing firms’ corporate governance arrangements. The CGQ system has
16
been widely used by investors and pubic firms, and its use among
17
academics is growing.
In Part II, we discuss the relationship between firms’ ownership
structures and the governance arrangements that would best protect
their investors. We begin by describing the basic differences between
controlled and widely held firms in terms of the governance problems
that their outside investors face. We then analyze the implications

13

See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON.
430, 432-33 (2008) (creating the Anti-Self-Dealing Index); Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1126-28 (1998) (establishing the Anti-Director
Rights Index).
14
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 460, 463-64, 463 n.1 (2006) (describing the influence of the Anti-Director
Rights Index and the extensive literature in its aftermath on policymakers at international economic organizations); see also Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance’ Revisited
(Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095526 (documenting the large number of studies on the
Anti-Director Rights Index).
15
See RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT, http://
www.riskmetrics.com/cgq (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
16
See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics,
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Feb. 2004, at 108, 111.
17
See, e.g., Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate Governance?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 11-12 (2007) (using firms’ CGQ scores as a proxy for the quality
of their corporate-governance arrangements); Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance Norms and Practices (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working
Paper No. 165/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965733 (studying the
relationship between CGQ scores and their components and firm value); Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 21-24 (Apr. 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891411 (reconstructing the CGQ Index to find correlation
between governance and firm value).
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that these differences have for key sets of governance arrangements:
those regulating control contests, voting procedures, the allocation of
power between directors and shareholders, the distribution of power
among shareholders (i.e., the allocation of power between majority
and minority shareholders), director independence, and corporate
transactions that may divert value to insiders.
With respect to each of these important areas, we show that the
impact of governance arrangements on outside investors depends significantly on whether the firm has a controlling shareholder. As a result, the failure of the Anti-Director Rights Index, the Anti-SelfDealing Index, and the CGQ system to properly take into account the
relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance
substantially undermines the indices’ ability to serve as effective metrics for the governance quality of firms or countries worldwide.
Consider, for example, antitakeover defenses such as the poison
pill. These arrangements determine the extent to which a widely held
company is subject, for better or worse, to the discipline of the market
18
for corporate control. In companies with a majority shareholder,
however, a hostile takeover is not feasible even in the absence of antitakeover impediments. Thus, even though takeover defenses are consequential for outside investors in widely held firms, they are unimportant in controlled companies. Using a single metric for assessing
both firms with and firms without a controller will therefore (1) overlook an important issue for widely held firms to the extent that the
metric does not give sufficient weight to antitakeover considerations,
(2) give weight to a largely irrelevant issue for controlled firms to the
extent that the metric gives significant weight to antitakeover considerations, or (3) produce some combination of both outcomes. Likewise, using a single metric for comparing countries where concentrated ownership is prevalent to those where widely-held firms
dominate, or more generally, countries that have a different mix of
these two types of firms, is likely to produce results that would be inaccurate for many purposes.
Our analysis should be distinguished from another type of criticism that can be raised against existing governance metrics. Some
writers question the value of any attempt to assess firms’ corporate
governance based on objective, externally verifiable criteria. They ar-

18

See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 338 (2000) (noting the limited nature of the
empirical research done on takeover defenses).
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gue that any useful governance evaluation must take into account a
rich set of dimensions (such as the character of the individuals in19
volved) that can only be assessed subjectively. In contrast, we do not
question the feasibility of developing a methodology for large-scale
governance assessments based on objective criteria. Rather, our critique is constructive: we seek to advance the project of developing
governance metrics based on objective and generally applicable criteria, not to abandon it altogether.
We therefore discuss in Part III how the assessment of corporategovernance arrangements should proceed. We argue that academics
and practitioners should seek to develop separate systems—one for
controlled and another for widely held firms—with each based on a set
of objective and externally verifiable dimensions. We contribute to this
effort by identifying, for both controlled and widely held firms, which
governance dimensions should occupy an important role and—no less
important—which dimensions should not. When assessing an individual company, one should use the rating methodology that fits the
company's ownership structure. We also discuss how one should use
these separate systems to assess investor protection at the country level.
Specifically, we explain why keeping separate scores for how a country
protects investors in companies with and without a controlling shareholder is valuable for researchers, policymakers, and investors.
For ease of exposition, we shall refer throughout to companies
with a controlling shareholder as “CS companies” and to those without a controller as “NCS companies.” At the outset, we should acknowledge that some public companies lie in the gray area between
these two pure types because they have a dominant shareholder with
substantial influence but not a complete lock on control. We leave for
another day the refinement of our analysis necessary for extending it
to such companies. Here we wish to focus on the task that we view as
most important and pressing given current practices: designing appropriate evaluation systems for the numerous public companies
19

See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 5, at 1808 (“[T]here is no one ‘best’ measure
of corporate governance: The most effective governance institution depends on context and on firms’ specific circumstances.”); Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 908 (2007) (arguing that one-size-fits-all methodologies “may
not capture relevant nuances in corporate governance policies and behaviors”); see also
J. Harold Mulherin, Corporations, Collective Action and Corporate Governance: One Size Does
Not Fit All, 124 PUB. CHOICE 179, 180 (2005) (“The multidimensional nature of corporate governance indicates that the focus in many reform proposals on a narrow set of
mechanisms ignores the substitutability and complementarity provided by the broad
set of forces operating on the corporation.”).
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around the world that can easily be classified as either CS or NCS.
These companies should be subject to the separate evaluation systems
that we advocate, not to a single, global governance metric.
I. THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL STANDARDS
A. The Demand for Global Standards
In recent years, corporate governance has become an important
topic for academics, institutional investors, and policymakers. There
is a widespread belief that the quality of corporate governance and investor protection can affect the performance of firms and economies.
At the firm level, inadequate investor protection may reduce firm
20
value and increase firms’ cost of capital. At the country level, inadequate investor protection may impede stock market development and
21
undermine financial growth.
Not surprisingly, the growing recognition of corporate governance’s importance has sparked substantial interest in measuring the
quality of corporate-governance arrangements across firms and countries. Scholars have sought such measures to study the link between
corporate governance and economic outcomes for both firms and
22
economies. Policymakers—including those affiliated with the World
Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—have been attracted to the promise of metrics that can facilitate efforts to improve
countries’ investor-protection systems and to assess their progress in
23
doing so. Finally, the growth of institutional investing and investors’
20

See Doidge et al., supra note 17, at 2 (“Better governance enables firms to access
capital markets on better terms, which is valuable for firms intending to raise funds.”).
21
See Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development 32
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10417, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=476083 (citing studies showing a positive correlation between
legal institutions that protect property rights and firm- and stock-price efficiency).
22
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (documenting the negative effect of certain “entrenchment”
corporate-governance practices); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 110-14 (2003) (measuring the effects of different corporategovernance provisions on equity prices).
23
For example, the World Bank’s “Doing Business” survey, which provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 181 economies,
relies on the Anti-Self-Dealing Index, which we discuss below, to measure countries’
level of investor protection. See Doing Business, Protecting Investors, http://
www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/ProtectingInvestors.aspx (last visited
Mar. 15, 2009). The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program uses the World
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increased attention to corporate governance has induced shareholder
advisers to develop governance metrics that could inform investment
24
decisions in companies around the world.
A comprehensive effort to survey all existing metrics and methodologies for assessing governance arrangements around the world
would require substantial space and, we believe, is unnecessary for establishing our main points. It will be useful, however, to illustrate
these points by reference to commonly used metrics. Section B discusses the most influential ranking system developed by a shareholder
adviser—RiskMetrics’s CGQ system. Section C describes the most influential global metrics developed by academics—the Anti-Director
Rights Index and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index.
B. Shareholder Advisers’ Efforts: The CGQ System
RiskMetrics is the world’s dominant provider of shareholder25
advisory services to institutional investors. Prior to being acquired by
RiskMetrics in 2007, its shareholder-advisory services operated inde26
pendently as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). When going
public in 2007, RiskMetrics reported that it “served approximately 1150
27
financial institutions that together manage an estimated $20 trillion,”
provided research coverage on more than 7400 U.S.-based companies
28
and approximately 22,000 non-U.S. companies, and had issued vote
recommendations for more than 38,000 shareholder meetings across

Bank’s Doing Business database to assess countries’ level of investor protection. See
IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT: A HANDBOOK 74 box 4.1 (2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/ch04.pdf.
24
See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 4-13 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 (noting the impact of institutional investors’ growing presence and the demand for governance-related services).
25
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY
VOTING 8 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf (describing
ISS as “the dominant advisory firm” and perhaps even “a potential barrier to competition in this industry”); Rose, supra note 19, at 889-90 (reporting some executives’ belief
that RiskMetrics—then ISS—“may control a third or more of the shareholder votes” in
the industry).
26
RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Amended Registration Statement for Face-Amount Certificate Companies (Form S-1/A), at 14, 87 (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://
investor.riskmetrics.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=215573&p=irol-sec (click “last”; then choose
document).
27
Id. at 87.
28
Id. at 88.
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29

100 countries during the preceding year. It is widely assumed that
30
RiskMetrics’s voting recommendations can affect vote outcomes, and
academic studies on the effects of shareholder advisers commonly fo31
cus on RiskMetrics’s recommendations.
Since 2002, ISS and RiskMetrics have offered a corporategovernance-rating system named the Corporate Governance Quotient.
RiskMetrics currently rates the governance arrangements of more
32
than 7400 companies in more than thirty markets. Many institutional investors receive these ratings as part of their subscription to
33
RiskMetrics’s services. Given the dominance of RiskMetrics in the
proxy-advisory market, it is not surprising that its CGQ ratings receive
34
much attention in the marketplace. Law firms advise their public-

29

Id. at 87.
See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 693 (2007) (“Getting a favorable ISS recommendation is therefore frequently essential to victory.”); see also Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1101924 (finding that directors with negative ISS recommendations receive
nineteen percent fewer votes than other directors); Ying Duan, The Role of Mutual
Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and
Trading Behavior 2 ( Jan. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1028367 (stating that mutual funds are more likely to vote against
management than to sell when management’s recommendations on proposals conflict
with those of ISS).
31
See, e.g., Stephen Choi et al., Director Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advisors 1
(NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Org. Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127282 (noting that ISS was “claimed to sway” between
twenty and thirty percent of proxy votes); Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting 2 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=966181 (quoting one Merrill Lynch analyst describing an
ISS recommendation, “If it had gone the other way, the deal would have been dead.
Now, it’s a horse race.”).
32
See RISKMETRICS GROUP, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT, http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/CGQ%20FAQ.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
33
See Daines et al., supra note 6, at 2, 4 (reporting varied empirical accounts of the
influence of governance ratings and noting that RiskMetrics was the largest commercial rater).
34
See Rose, supra note 19, at 898-99 (“Proxy advisers generally base their decisions
on corporate governance standards that are derived from the same policies as those
used to formulate governance ratings and related governance advice.”); see also INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS US CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2007 UPDATES 24
(2007), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/2007_US_Policy_
Update.pdf (describing steps taken to align governance ratings with the company’s
voting policy).
30
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company clients on how to improve their CGQ scores, public com36
panies with high CGQ scores boast about them, RiskMetrics offers
public companies fee-based consulting services for improving their
37
CGQ scores, and the popular “Yahoo! Finance” web site includes
38
CGQ scores in companies’ online profiles.
Although the CGQ system was developed by a commercialshareholder adviser, academics increasingly use it as a measure of the
quality of firms’ governance arrangements. Researchers, for example,
have analyzed the link between RiskMetrics’s governance scores and
39
firm performance, tried to assess which CGQ factors affect firm
40
valuation, and used companies’ CGQ scores to study governance dif41
ferences between banking and nonbanking firms.
Although RiskMetrics has one set of criteria (also referred to as
factors) for rating U.S. firms and another set for rating non-U.S. firms,
the two sets largely overlap. Both divide corporate-governance factors
into eight categories: board (including board size and the nominating committees); audit; charter/bylaws (including features such as
poison pills and special meetings); antitakeover provisions; executive
and director compensation; progressive practices (for example, CEOsuccession planning); ownership (including board-performance re-

35
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KOLAR & ANDREW J. NEUHARTH, OPPENHEIMER WOLFF &
DONNELLY LLP, WHAT’S YOUR “CGQ” IQ? WHAT EVERY CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT (2007), available at
http://www.oppenheimer.com/newsletters/CGQ _IQ.pdf.
36
See, e.g., Alliant Techsystems Inc., Corporate Governance, http://www.atk.com/
CorporateGovernance/corpgov_commitment.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) (proudly
touting its CGQ score).
37
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS:
ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING
10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf (noting that ISS “offers corporate governance consulting services to help clients understand and improve
their corporate governance ratings”).
38
See, e.g., Yahoo! Finance, Microsoft Corporation, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
pr?s=MSFT (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
39
See, e.g., Ruth W. Epps & Sandra J. Cereola, Do Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) Corporate Governance Ratings Reflect a Company’s Operating Performance?, 19 CRITICAL
PERSP. ON ACCT. 1135 (2008) (presenting methodology for comparing CGQ scores
and corporate performance and concluding that there is no relationship).
40
See Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 411 (2006) (identifying seven governance factors
that are the key drivers of the link between governance and valuation).
41
See Chenchuramaiah Bathala et al., Industry Differences in Corporate Governance:
The Case of Banking and Non-Banking Firms, 13 ICFAI J. APPLIED FIN. 17 (relying on CGQ
scores to study governance differences between bank and nonbank firms).
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view and stock ownership by directors); and director education. Both
42
sets include similar criteria within each of the eight areas.
The CGQ system rates the performance of any given company
with respect to each factor and then uses this rating to produce both a
raw score for the company and a relative score that rates the company
in comparison to others in the same investment index or industry
43
group. For our purposes, the key feature of the CGQ system is that it
applies the same criteria to companies that do and do not have a controlling shareholder. As we shall show in subsequent sections, this
uniform approach is unwarranted.
Perhaps because RiskMetrics is headquartered in the United
States, where CS companies are less common, a significant fraction of
the CGQ factors may be valuable for outside investors in NCS companies but are irrelevant, or even harmful, for investor protection in CS
companies. Whatever the reason for this feature, we shall show that
the CGQ system clearly illustrates the problems that arise when a single metric is used for assessing governance around the world.
C. Academics’ Efforts: The Anti-Director Rights Index
and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index
Among academic researchers, the most influential metric for
evaluating governance arrangements worldwide has been the AntiDirector Rights Index, developed by a team of four financial economists. More recently, three members of this team joined a World Bank
economist to construct a new metric, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index, as
an alternative to the Anti-Director Rights Index.

42

For a list of the U.S. governance attributes, see RISKMETRICS GROUP, SUMMARY:
CGQ RATINGS CRITERIA FOR US COMPANIES, http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/
default/files/CGQ _Criteria_US.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) [hereinafter RISKMETRICS, U.S. CRITERIA]. For a list of the non-U.S. governance variables, see RISKMETRICS
GROUP, SUMMARY:
CGQ RATINGS CRITERIA FOR NON-US COMPANIES, http://
www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/CGQ_Criteria_exUS.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2009) [hereinafter RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA]. A more detailed description of
the U.S. CGQ factors may be found in RISKMETRICS GROUP, CGQ BEST PRACTICES MANUAL (US) (2008) [hereinafter, RISKMETRICS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES]. A more detailed description of the non-U.S. CGQ factors may be found in RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT: INDICATOR DEFINITIONS (NON-U.S. COMPANIES) (2007) [hereinafter, RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS]. The latter two documents may
be requested from RiskMetrics at http://www.riskmetrics.com/contact.
43
See RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT: METHODOLOGY,
http://www.riskmetrics.com/cgq/methodology (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
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1. The Anti-Director Rights Index
In a 1998 article titled Law and Finance, four financial economists—La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (commonly
referred to in subsequent work as LLSV)—developed the AntiDirector Rights Index and used it to study and compare investor pro44
Their findings sparked a vast
tection across forty-nine countries.
academic literature. Indeed, academics have thus far used the AntiDirector Rights Index in almost one hundred cross-country quantita45
tive studies, for example, to examine the association between investor protection and firm valuation, voting premia, firm-level corporategovernance mechanisms, the prevalence of earnings management,
46
and the depth of financial crises. The use of the index has not been

44

La Porta et al., supra note 13; see also Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 24 (2000) (arguing that strong investor protection is empirically linked with “valuable and broad financial markets”); La Porta et al.,
supra note 3, at 1132 (“We compare external finance across 49 countries as a function of
the origin of their laws, the quality of legal investor protections, and the quality of law
enforcement.”). See generally Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 286-87 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic
Consequences] (developing a “Legal Origins Theory” based on historical differences between various legal traditions).
45
See Spamann, supra note 14, at 1-3 (reporting that the Anti-Director Rights Index has been used in almost one hundred such studies but challenging the accuracy of
the underlying data).
46
See generally Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal
Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461 (2005) (studying the extent of variation between firm governance and the strength of the legal regime); Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141, 142 (2000) (presenting “evidence that the weakness of legal institutions for corporate governance had” an
impact on the Asian financial crisis); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002) (analyzing the theoretical and empirical effects of
investor protection on firm valuation); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting
Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003) (examining control premia); Christian Leuz et al., Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 505, 506 (2003) (providing “comparative evidence
on corporate earnings management across 31 countries”). More recent studies have
also explored these themes. See, e.g., Jay Dahya et al., Dominant Shareholders, Corporate
Boards, and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73, 73-76 (2008)
(examining the role of board composition and independent directors in relation to external investor protections in firms with a dominant shareholder); Ivalina Kalcheva &
Karl V. Lins, International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1087, 1087-88 (2007) (finding a relationship between cash management and firm valuation when external investor protection is weak but not when it is
strong); Mariassunta Giannetti & Yrjö Koskinen, Investor Protection, Equity Returns,
and Financial Globalization 1-3 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=942513 (arguing that weak investor-protection mechanisms
create an incentive for shareholders to purchase controlling stakes).
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limited to corporate-finance research but has extended to the study of
47
other issues, such as financial integration and the relationship be48
tween risk sharing and industrial specialization.
49
The Anti-Director Rights Index consists of six components.
Three focus on shareholder voting rights: the requirement that
shareholders deposit their shares before a shareholder meeting, the
ability of shareholders to cast a vote by mail, and the minimum percentage of share ownership that allows a shareholder to call a special
50
shareholder meeting.
A fourth component focuses on shareholders’ preemptive rights—
whether the law grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new
issues of stock (unless the shareholders have waived their right by a
51
vote). A fifth component focuses on cumulative voting—whether
there is a mechanism by which minority interests may name a propor52
tional number of directors to the board. The final component, often
referred to as “oppressed minority mechanisms,” focuses on whether
minority shareholders objecting to fundamental changes (such as
mergers, asset dispositions, and changes to the articles of incorporation) have a right to challenge those decisions in court or to “exit” by
53
requiring the company to purchase their shares.
As we will explain, the Anti-Director Rights Index cannot provide
an adequate measure of investor-protection levels around the world.
Most notably, three of the index’s components—shareholders’ ability
to vote by mail, to vote without depositing shares, and to call a special
meeting—are largely irrelevant to companies with a controlling
shareholder: in such companies, regardless of the voting arrangements in place, minority shareholders normally will lack effective
power either to pass resolutions that the majority shareholder opposes
or to block resolutions that the majority shareholder favors.

47

See Jean Imbs, The Real Effects of Financial Integration, 68 J. INT’L ECON. 296, 31819 (2006) (including the Anti-Director Rights Index in the calculation of financial
integration).
48
See Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al., Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization: Regional and International Evidence, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 903 (2003) (using the indices as
part of a study of industrial specialization).
49
See La Porta et al., supra note 13, at 1127-28.
50
Id. at 1127.
51
Id. at 1128.
52
Id.
53
Id. In addition to the Anti-Director Rights Index, LLSV also take into account
two variables: “one share, one vote” and “mandatory dividends.” See La Porta et al.,
supra note 13, at 1122-23.
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To be sure, as we will discuss in Part II, these voting arrangements
may not be the most important governance provisions even in NCS
companies, but they do provide some protection for outside investors
in such companies. This is not the case for CS companies. Thus, the
Anti-Director Rights Index well illustrates our thesis concerning the
problems involved in using investor-protection measures that purport
54
to apply to all companies regardless of their ownership structure.
2. The Anti-Self-Dealing Index
Three of the designers of the Anti-Director Rights Index recently
teamed with a World Bank economist (together commonly referred to
55
as DLLS) to develop a new index. The DLLS team offered this AntiSelf-Dealing Index as a superior alternative to the Anti-Director Rights
56
Index. Although relatively new, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index has al57
ready been used significantly in research by financial economists.

54

Commentators have questioned the Anti-Director Rights Index on a variety of
grounds. Some argue that the index does not capture all the arrangements that are
important for investor protection. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE
L.J. 1, 4 n.6 (2001) (arguing that the shareholder rights captured by LLSV “supply
only partial and sometimes easily outflanked safeguards, which have little to do with
the protection of control and the entitlement to a control premium”). Others argue
that the index adopts a U.S.-centric approach. See Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems,
Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17, 20-21 (2007) (noting that the inclusion of variables like cumulative voting and the exclusion of variables like director entrenchment reflect a U.S. bias). Lawyers have been skeptical of
the attempt to use a single measure for evaluating the quality of legal protection
across countries and have identified some mistakes. See, e.g., Udo C. Braendle,
Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—“Law and Finance” Revisited, 7 GERMAN
L.J. 257, 258 (2006) (arguing that LLSV did not adequately consider German company law); Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan, 3
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 765, 769-83 (2002) (U.K.) (evaluating differences between
corporate law on and off the books and the impact of enforcement). Others explore
the methodological difficulties associated with coding such legal variables. See, e.g.,
Spamann, supra note 14 (attempting, and failing, to replicate the data presented by
LLSV). Our thesis, however, is markedly different. We argue that any attempt to
develop a single measure for evaluating corporate governance for both controlled
and widely held firms is inherently misguided.
55
Djankov et al., supra note 13.
56
See id. at 432 (discussing improvements vis-à-vis the Anti-Director Rights Index).
57
See Doidge et al., supra note 17, at 16 (using the Anti-Self-Dealing Index as a
measure of investor rights); Valentina G. Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance
and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? 14 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 142/2007, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
956329 (using the Anti-Self-Dealing Index as a measure of investor protection); Augusto
de la Torre et al., Capital Market Development: Whither Latin America?, 7 (World Bank Pol-
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This index focuses on the extent to which outside investors are
protected from expropriation by insiders using self-dealing transactions, and it includes measures such as disclosure, public enforcement, approval of self-dealing transactions by disinterested shareholders, shareholders’ legal standing to challenge a self-dealing
transaction in court, and the ability to hold controlling shareholders
58
and directors liable for self-dealing transactions. The DLLS team argued that the Anti-Self-Dealing Index is theoretically grounded and
found it to be a more robust predictor of the development of stock
59
markets than the Anti-Director Rights Index.
As we shall explain below, however, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index
also cannot provide an adequate yardstick for assessing investor protection around the world. Whereas the Anti-Director Rights Index
was shaped largely by reasoning relevant to investor protection for
NCS companies, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index focuses on measures
relevant primarily to CS companies. As a result, the Anti-Self-Dealing
Index ignores dimensions that are quite important for investor protection in NCS companies. To be sure, CS firms are presumably
dominant in most countries. Yet, as Part III will explain, researchers
assessing a country’s level of investor protection should keep separate
scores for how well it protects outside investors at CS firms and how
well it protects such investors at NCS firms.
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
We now turn to analyzing the relationship between ownership
structure—that is, the presence or absence of a controlling shareholder—and investor protection. As we will explain, differences in
ownership structure affect the nature of problems that outside investors face and, in turn, the measures that could be most effective in
addressing these problems.
Section A begins by describing the fundamental differences between CS and NCS companies. We then analyze the implications of
these differences for different areas of corporate governance. Specifi-

icy Res. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 4156, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=967890 (same).
58
For a detailed description, see Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 433-36.
59
See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 44, at 294 (“[A] two–standard
deviation increase in the anti-self-dealing index is associated with an increase in the
stock-market-to-GDP ratio of 42 percentage points, an increase in listed firms per capita
of 38 percent, and a reduction in ownership concentration of 6 percentage points.”).

2009]

Global Governance Standards

1281

cally, we discuss control contests (Section B), voting procedures (Section C), the allocation of power between the board and shareholders
(Section D), the allocation of power between majority and minority
shareholders (Section E), director independence (Section F), and arrangements governing potential value diversion (Section G).
A. Some Fundamental Differences Between CS and NCS Companies
We begin with some general observations about the fundamental
dissimilarities between CS and NCS companies. In particular, we focus on differences in terms of (1) the nature of the agency problem
for outside investors, (2) the contestability of control, (3) the ability of
a majority of shareholders to exercise their formal power, and (4) the
main ways in which opportunism benefits insiders.
1. Nature of the Agency Problem
When outside investors provide capital to a public firm, they face
the risk that the insiders who influence the firm’s decisions will act
opportunistically and advance their own private interests. Although
this general problem exists in both CS and NCS firms, these firms differ in the identity of the insiders from whom outside investors need
protection.
In NCS companies, shareholders’ inability to use effectively their
power to monitor officers and directors (to whom we refer collectively
as “management”) provides management with a significant measure of
de facto control. Because management’s interests may diverge from
those of shareholders, the fundamental concern that governance arrangements need to address is management’s potential to behave op60
portunistically at the expense of shareholders.
In CS companies, in contrast, controlling shareholders commonly
have both the effective means to monitor management and the incen61
tives to do so. Thus, to the extent that the controllers have some interests in common with those of outside investors, the controller’s

60

For an in-depth analysis of the divergence of interests between shareholders and
management in NCS firms, see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
61
See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (“[A] controlling shareholder may police the management of public corporations better than the standard
panoply of market-oriented techniques employed when shareholdings are widely held.”).
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presence lessens the concern that management will act contrary to
these interests. Controllers, however, may also have interests that do
not overlap with those of outside investors, and they may use their
power to advance such interests. In CS companies, therefore, the
fundamental concern that needs to be addressed by governance ar62
rangements is the controlling shareholder’s opportunism.
2. Contestability of Control
In CS companies, control is not contestable. The controlling
shareholder has a lock on control by virtue of its ownership of a majority of the voting rights—or at least a sufficient percentage of voting
rights to secure an effective lock on control. In NCS companies, in
contrast, control is at least in theory contestable, though the extent to
which it is contestable in practice depends on the governance arrangements that we will discuss later.
The difference in contestability has important implications for
corporate governance. When an active market for corporate control
exists, insiders are subject to the threat of removal if they fail to
maximize shareholder value. This disciplinary mechanism, the
strength of which depends on the governance arrangements in place,
can enhance share value and reduce the need for other mechanisms
for constraining management. In CS companies, however, the threat
of a control contest does not exist and cannot constrain insider opportunism.
3. Ability of a Majority of Shareholders to
Exercise Their Formal Power
In NCS companies, governance arrangements must be assessed
against the background of collective action and free-rider problems
that often prevent outside shareholders from effectively using whatever
formal powers that they have to constrain and influence manage63
ment. Consider a shareholder with a one-percent stake who is contemplating whether to take an action that would enhance share value.
The shareholder may be discouraged by the prospect of having to bear
the full cost of taking such an action while capturing only one percent
62
See also Enriques & Volpin, supra note 11, at 117 (“[C]oncentrated ownership
can create conditions for a new agency problem, because the interests of controlling
and minority shareholders are not aligned.”).
63
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 66-67 (1991).
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of the benefits. The arrangements governing NCS companies must be
assessed against the background of collective action and free-rider
problems. Put differently, one generally cannot assume that outside
shareholders holding a majority of the shares collectively will use their
formal powers to advance the course of action that they prefer.
In CS companies, in contrast, the controller is likely to use its formal powers to maximize the value of the shares it owns. The controller will generally capture at least a significant share of the appreciation in value that these actions produce and thus will have significant
64
incentives to exercise power. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume
that controllers will make significant use of their formal powers to advance the course of action that they prefer.
4. The Main Ways in Which Opportunism Benefits Insiders
CS and NCS companies differ not only in the identity of the insiders whose potential opportunism should be constrained, but also in
the main ways in which insider opportunism is manifested. Compared
to professional managers in NCS companies, controllers often have
extra avenues for diverting significant value.
Controllers are often individuals or firms that have businesses
other than the public firm in question and considerable outside
wealth. This is especially true in the many countries in which a relatively small number of dominant families controls many public com65
panies through pyramids and other forms of business groups. In
contrast, professional managers at NCS companies are less likely to
own—fully or partly—significant businesses outside the public company that they manage. The ownership of significant outside busi66
nesses provides controllers with additional ways to divert value. For
controlling shareholders, large self-dealing transactions with other en64

Moreover, for a holder of the majority of the votes, the cost of monitoring and
disciplining management is likely to be lower than it is for outside shareholders. For
example, directors and officers are more likely to provide a controlling shareholder
with information concerning the company’s performance, and the controller does not
need to communicate with other shareholders to secure a majority of the votes.
65
See, e.g., Faccio & Lang, supra note 10, at 390 tbl.8 (presenting evidence on the
prevalence of pyramidal ownership structures in Western Europe); Khanna & Yafeh,
supra note 10, at 332 (“[I]n virtually all emerging markets, group affiliated firms tend
to be relatively large and economically important.”).
66
See Vladimir Atanasov et al., Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling (Univ. of Tex.
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 117, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1030529 (discussing the different ways in which controlling persons
may extract wealth from firms).
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tities affiliated with them and freezeout transactions often provide an
67
important channel for extracting private benefits.
Diversion of value through executive compensation, however, is a
concern of lesser importance in CS companies than in NCS companies. First, to the extent that the company’s executives are professional managers not affiliated with the controller, the controller generally has an interest in setting executive compensation to maximize
68
shareholder value. Second, even when individuals affiliated with the
controller serve in a managerial capacity, the controller may well elect
not to maximize diversion through excessive compensation, given its
ability to extract private benefits on a larger scale through other
69
means, such as related-party transactions.
There is yet another related difference in the ways that insider
opportunism manifests itself in CS and NCS companies. Managerial
shirking and empire building are more serious concerns in NCS com70
panies than in CS companies. Such practices provide insiders with

67

For evidence on self-dealing involving companies within the same business
groups, see, for example, Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from
Mergers by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695 (2002); Marianne Bertrand et al., Ferreting
Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, 117 Q .J. ECON. 121 (2002). For a
comprehensive analysis of legal issues that arise in the context of freezeout transactions,
see generally Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2 (2005).
68
Controllers might use generous compensation arrangements to induce managers to facilitate controllers’ value diversion through self-dealing and other transactions.
Controllers, however, are often quite influential in making a decision to hire or terminate managers. This means that managers who want to get hired or keep their job
have an incentive to cater to the controller preferences even without being paid for
their cooperation with value diversion.
69
Another difference is the role of directors’ stock ownership. In NCS companies, stock ownership can incentivize outside directors to monitor management. See,
e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864 (1993) (arguing that encouraging directors to hold
substantial equity interests would provide better oversight incentives). But see Assaf
Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677,
1682-83 (2007) (arguing that equity pay for directors “cannot substitute for direct
monitoring incentives”). In CS firms, however, directors’ stock ownership might be
less important. If the director is the controller or its affiliate, then equity ownership is
unlikely to provide incentives beyond those already provided by owning the control
block. Even when the director is independent, however, the incentives provided
through stock ownership are likely outweighed by the controller’s influence over director elections.
70
See Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, The One Share–One Vote Debate: A Theoretical Perspective 28 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 176/2007,
2007) (“In spite of stock option plans and the like, compensation packages for top executives typically dwindle in comparison to the equity stakes of most large owners.”).
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71

nonpecuniary benefits while reducing share value, and a controller
with a large ownership stake will bear a substantial fraction of the
costs. A controlling shareholder therefore has an incentive to avoid
72
such actions when managing the company and to prevent them
when the company is run by professional managers. Thus, in the
presence of a controller with a large ownership stake, managerial
shirking and empire building are relatively less important concerns.
*

*

*

With these four fundamental differences in mind, we now consider the relationship between ownership structure and several key
sets of governance arrangements. As our analysis will demonstrate,
one should distinguish between CS and NCS companies when assessing each of these key sets of governance arrangements.
B. Control Contests
1. The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
One important difference between CS and NCS companies concerns the potential role of battles for corporate control—that is, hostile takeover bids and proxy contests. Although such contests and the
governance arrangements regulating them are quite important for
NCS companies, they are largely irrelevant to CS companies.
Anyone approaching governance arrangements from a U.S. perspective finds it natural to assume that the arrangements governing
control contests are a key element in the governance of public companies. After all, these arrangements have long occupied a central
role in discussions of corporate and securities laws by academics and
73
policymakers in the United States. Textbooks or treatises on United
States corporate law devote substantial space to arrangements govern-

71

See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (“Managers have incentives to cause their
firms to grow beyond the optimal size.”).
72
See David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior
Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006) (finding that firms whose CEOs personally use company jets underperform market benchmarks).
73
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002) (“In the last thirty years, takeover law has been the subject
most hotly debated by corporate law scholars.”).
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74

ing takeovers and proxy fights . Lawmakers have devoted considerable legislative effort to enacting antitakeover statutes and promulgat75
ing regulatory rules governing tender offers and control contests.
The Delaware courts have developed an extensive body of takeover
76
case law. Numerous studies by legal scholars, as well as financial
economists, focus on the arrangements governing hostile bids and
77
proxy fights. And investors have devoted considerable attention to
antitakeover defenses and have made them the subject of a large frac78
tion of all shareholder proposals.
The dominant view among U.S. scholars and shareholder advisers
is that firms should adopt governance arrangements that facilitate
79
control contests. Because the threat of a hostile takeover or a proxy
fight is commonly viewed as providing an important market-based
check on management, a vibrant market for corporate control can re80
duce the agency problem underlying NCS firms. This view is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence indicating that exposure to the threat of a hostile takeover is associated with higher firm
81
value and better performance. Such evidence has led U.S. academics
74

See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS OR315-24, 1040-1114 (9th ed. 2005).
75
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1801-02 (2006) (describing three decades of state antitakeover legislation).
76
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 248 (1989)
(analyzing the standard of review applied by the Delaware courts to defensive measures
taken by the target board).
77
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (criticizing
managerial resistance to premium tender offers); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV.
819, 819-21 (1981) (noting the conflict of interest that managers face in the tenderoffer setting and proposing a structural solution); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982) (advocating a
rule of auctioneering to promote competition among premium tender offers).
78
See GEORGESON, 2007 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 6 (2007), available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2007.pdf (noting that,
while currently in decline, shareholder proposals addressing antitakeover defenses have
dominated the proxy landscape for years).
79
We share this view. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 75, at 1805-07.
80
See Henry G. Manne, Op-Ed., Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2002, at A18 (“New scandals will continue until we bring back the most powerful market mechanism for displacing bad managers: hostile takeovers.”).
81
See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage
Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535, 545 (1999) (finding
that the adoption of antitakeover statutes led to higher labor costs); Kenneth A.
GANIZATIONS
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to use the extent to which control is contestable as a standard measure
82
of a firm’s quality of corporate governance.
For similar reasons, proxy contests also can play an important role
in disciplining managers of NCS companies. U.S. law provides a variety of arrangements to regulate and facilitate such contests, including
allowing insurgents to reimburse their expenses in the event that they
gain control, providing shareholders with some access to the company’s proxy machinery, and preventing fraud and manipulation of
83
voting. And Delaware courts have expressed their willingness to intervene when management has tried to adopt measures impeding
84
proxy contests.
To be sure, some U.S. scholars and practitioners believe that exposing managers to control contests may be counterproductive and
produce short-termism as well as wasteful distraction for manage85
ment. But even those who support insulating boards from control
contests share the views that the arrangements governing hostile bids
and proxy challenges are important and that the choice of such arrangements can significantly affect—for better or worse—firm value.
In contrast, the arrangements governing control contests are
largely irrelevant to CS companies. When a company has a majority

Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495, 1515
(1997) (stating that executives with stronger antitakeover defenses enjoy higher compensation levels); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate
Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. FIN. 519, 520 (1999) (reporting that antitakeover statutes “allow managers to pursue goals other than maximizing shareholder wealth”); Gompers et al., supra note 22, at 111, 129 (concluding that
companies with managers who enjoy more protection from takeovers are associated
with poorer operating performance).
82
See Bhagat et al., supra note 5, at 1811-12 (“Firms that adopt devices to impede
control changes are . . . conventionally characterized as firms with poor corporate governance, because the managers of those firms are not subject to the disciplining force
of hostile bids.”); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 22 (measuring corporate governance quality based on provisions that affect entrenchment); Gompers et al., supra note
22, at 111 (using voting rights, director/officer protection, and the ability to delay hostile bidders as measures of corporate governance).
83
For a review of these mechanisms, see WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ch. 7 (2d ed. 2007).
84
See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660-62 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(holding that a board action with the primary purpose of interfering with the shareholder franchise must be supported by a “compelling justification”).
85
See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037,
1039 (2002) (arguing that there are substantial costs to having companies constantly
subjected to control contests); Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1436 (2005) (supporting
Lipton’s thesis both positively and normatively).
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shareholder, or at least a controller with an effective lock on control,
the management team supported by the controller cannot be replaced even in the absence of any impediments to hostile bids and
proxy fights: the controller simply has enough votes to prevent the
86
team’s removal. For the level of investor protection at CS companies, therefore, the presence of arrangements providing protection
against a hostile takeover or a proxy fight is neither good nor bad, but
87
simply irrelevant.
2. Treatment by Governance Standards
We have seen that the arrangements governing control contests
are important for NCS companies but not for CS companies. These
arrangements should therefore get substantial weight in assessing the
governance of NCS companies but not of CS companies. It follows
that any governance-rating system that assigns a given weight to the
arrangements that govern control contests, without distinguishing between CS and NCS companies, is bound to overweight this factor in
assessing CS companies, underweight it in assessing NCS companies,
or both.
Consider first RiskMetrics’s CGQ system. Regardless of a company’s ownership structure, this system assigns considerable weight to
companies’ antitakeover arrangements. Antitakeover provisions are
one of the eight categories of factors in the CGQ’s list of rated fac88
tors. The factors included in this category represent a significant
fraction of the rated factors for both U.S. and non-U.S. firms: for U.S.
firms, six out of more than sixty factors focus on poison pill features,

86

See Gilson, supra note 61, at 1667-68 (discussing the economic implications of
inefficient controllers’ failure to relinquish control); Randall K. Morck et al., Inherited
Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease?, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 319 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (same).
87
Although the rules governing control contests do not affect significantly the
level of investor protection at CS firms, it should be noted that such rules can affect
founders’ initial decision whether to retain a control block. When control is contestable, entrepreneurs with substantial private benefits of control are less likely to relinquish control to the market when taking their companies public. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=203110.
88
See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA, supra note 42, ¶ 34. The U.S. CGQ criteria refer to this category as “State of Incorporation.” See RISKMETRICS, U.S. CRITERIA,
supra note 42.
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while seven other factors focus on state antitakeover provisions. For
non-U.S. firms, seven rating provisions out of fifty-five in the list of
rated factors focus on features of the company’s poison pill and take90
over defenses.
Although the CGQ systems attach substantial weight to antitakeover provisions in rating both U.S. and non-U.S. firms, in neither case
do they distinguish between CS and NCS firms. In both cases, a company with a controlling shareholder can receive a perfect score on all
the antitakeover variables, thus substantially increasing its overall governance ranking, even though the absence of defenses against a hostile bid is irrelevant in protecting outside investors in such a company.
Like the CGQ system, the Anti-Director Rights Index also gives
significant weight to arrangements that could affect control contests.
As noted earlier, it assigns considerable weight to three arrangements
concerning shareholder voting: shareholders’ rights to call a special
91
meeting, to vote by mail, and to vote without depositing shares. Although each of these arrangements can sometimes facilitate the wresting of control from the incumbent directors of an NCS company,
these provisions are probably not the most important arrangements
with respect to control contests; the Anti-Director Rights Index does
not consider, for example, whether management can use a poison
pill. But while the three arrangements given weight by the index can
affect the extent to which control contests are facilitated and are thus
relevant to assessing the governance of NCS companies, they have little relevance to assessing the governance of CS companies.
The Anti-Self-Dealing Index suffers from the opposite shortcoming. Unlike the Anti-Director Rights Index, it includes none of the
governance arrangements that affect the extent to which control con92
tests are facilitated or impeded. This feature does not undermine
the index’s usefulness for assessing the governance of CS companies,
but does undermine it in the case of NCS companies.

89

See RISKMETRICS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 42, ¶¶ 27–32, at 18-21 (giving
standards for poison pill adoption, shareholder approval, and trigger level, among
other things); id. ¶¶ 40–46, at 26-27 (giving standards for state antitakeover law).
90
See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA, supra note 42, ¶¶ 22–27, 34. Note that we
do not have information concerning the relative weight that RiskMetrics assigns to each
governance measure for purposes of generating a company’s ultimate CGQ score.
91
See La Porta et al., supra note 13, at 1122 tbl.1; see also supra subsection I.C.1.
92
See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 434 tbl.1.
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C. Voting Procedures
1. The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
Corporate law statutes typically include detailed procedures that
93
govern shareholder voting. These often-technical rules aim to facilitate the ability of a majority of shareholders to express their preferences by voting on certain issues. These rules affect the cost of casting
a vote—for example, by allowing shareholders to vote by mail or proxy
or by requiring shareholders to deposit their shares before voting.
They also affect the extent to which voting outcomes accurately reflect
the undistorted opinions of a majority of shareholders—for example,
94
by regulating broker-voting and confidential-voting arrangements.
In addition, the rules affect shareholders’ ability to act in a timely
manner by calling a special meeting or by acting by written consent.
Finally, voting rules can facilitate shareholders’ ability to influence
management by specifying the conditions under which shareholder
proposals must be included in the company’s proxy materials and the
95
issues on which such proposals may be submitted.
The arrangements that govern shareholder voting can be quite
important for investor protection at NCS companies. In these companies, shareholders’ power to elect directors and to vote on other
fundamental issues has long been considered one of the key mechanisms for aligning management’s and shareholders’ interests. Although some of the rules governing shareholder voting may appear to
deal mainly with technicalities, they can affect voting outcomes significantly. For example, a shareholder with a limited stake may not
initiate a proposal to amend the company’s bylaws—even if the proposal is likely to win majority support—unless the shareholder has the
right to have the proposal included in the company’s proxy materials.
For similar reasons, shareholders may not bother to vote for a pro-

93

For a review of the arrangements governing shareholder voting under U.S. federal law and state corporate statutes, see generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 83, ch. 7.
94
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96
GEO. L.J. 1227, 1250 (2008) (discussing the ability of brokers to use their discretion to
vote shares when proxy materials are not delivered).
95
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW.
43, 61-63 (2003) (arguing that changing proxy rules to increase shareholder access to
voting will reduce management’s insulation). But see Martin Lipton & Steven A.
Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59
BUS. LAW. 67, 83-84 (2003) (arguing that elections are disruptive of the company’s
time and resources).

2009]

Global Governance Standards

1291

posal that they support (or against a proposal that they oppose) if
casting a vote is too costly or burdensome. Because some outside
shareholders may decide not to vote their shares, brokers can have a
96
significant influence on vote outcomes. Finally, confidential voting
may make a difference when some shareholders fear retaliation if they
97
vote against the company’s incumbent directors.
Given the foundational role of shareholder voting, some U.S.
scholars and shareholder advisers believe that it is desirable to facilitate the ability of a majority of the shareholders to express their
98
views. To be sure, some of those who support insulating boards from
99
control contests hold the opposite view. But all commentators would
agree that the arrangements governing shareholder voting are likely
to be consequential, one way or another, especially with the recent in100
crease of institutional-shareholder activism.
In CS companies, in contrast, the rules governing voting procedures are likely to be inconsequential. Controllers—unaffected by the
collective action and free-rider problems that discourage action by
dispersed shareholders—will exercise their voting power even without
rules to facilitate shareholder voting. Furthermore, as long as a con101
troller has enough votes to determine voting outcomes, even rules
that facilitate voting by minority shareholders will not enable them to
pass resolutions not favored by the controller.

96

See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 8-9 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
pwg_report.pdf (discussing the significant influence of broker votes in “routine” matters such as “just vote no” campaigns).
97
But see Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
465, 465-67 (2003) (reporting evidence that the adoption of confidential voting has no
significant effect on voting outcomes).
98
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that allowing shareholders to intervene in major
corporate decisions will improve overall corporate governance).
99
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (challenging the proposal to empower shareholders as
not inherently value enhancing and arguing to retain the current regime of limited
shareholder voting rights).
100
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power:
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 477 (2008) (“The
ability of . . . institutional actors to coordinate at a much lower cost changes the collective action equation and rejuvenates a shareholder activism that depends on voting as a
credible mechanism for shareholder influence, even outside of a control contest.”);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 94, at 1229 (“Never has voting been more important in corporate law.”).
101
We discuss majority-of-minority voting conditions in the next Section.
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2. Treatment by Governance Standards
The CGQ rating system includes two factors concerning voting
procedures—shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting and share102
holders’ ability to act by written consent. Similarly, the Anti-Director
Rights Index includes three components related to shareholder voting—voting by mail, voting without depositing shares, and the mini103
mum ownership required to call a special shareholder meeting.
As explained above, shareholder voting arrangements are important for investor protection at NCS companies but not at CS companies. Measures that enable minority shareholders to call a special
meeting, act by written consent, vote by mail, or vote without depositing shares are unlikely to provide effective constraints on opportunism
by controlling shareholders. The fact that the CGQ system and the
Anti-Director Rights Index give significant weight to voting procedures
thus undermines their effectiveness in assessing governance in CS
companies (or countries with a significant presence of CS companies).
In contrast to the CGQ rating system and the Anti-Director Rights
Index, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index gives no weight to voting arrange104
That feature of the index does not affect its usefulness for
ments.
assessing governance of CS companies. It does, however, undermine
its effectiveness in assessing corporate governance at NCS companies
(or countries in which NCS companies are common).
D. Allocation of Power Between the Board and Shareholders
1. The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
In recent years, researchers and investors have paid significant attention to mechanisms strengthening shareholders’ ability to have
their preferences followed by the board—that is, measures reducing
105
the extent to which the board is insulated from shareholder wishes.
Because the primary agency problem in NCS companies is that management’s interests may diverge from those of shareholders, arrange102

See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA, supra note 42, ¶¶ 30–31.
See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
104
See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 434 tbl.1.
105
See Bebchuk, supra note 98, at 870 (arguing that the current system of corporate governance, in which shareholder-initiated change is ruled out, demands reform);
see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 53, 55 (2008) (“Recently shareholders have launched an aggressive campaign to
increase their voting power within the corporation.”).
103
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ments making it difficult for the board to disregard shareholder preferences can enhance investor protection in such companies.
Indeed, the arrangements facilitating hostile takeovers and proxy
fights, which we discussed in Section B, can be viewed as mechanisms
that enable shareholders to have their preferences followed when they
wish to sell the company or replace its management. The prospect of
removal in a control contest or a proxy fight may induce directors to
follow shareholder preferences on various other matters. Nonetheless, directors and officers may be more likely to follow shareholder
preferences if shareholders can express those preferences on matters
106
other than takeovers or director elections.
Scholars, shareholder advisers, and policymakers have advocated a
variety of measures that strengthen shareholders’ ability to influence
board decisions. One set of proposals aims at enhancing shareholder
influence on the “rules of the game”—the company’s governance ar107
rangements. Examples include measures preventing the board from
amending the bylaws (or at least shareholder-adopted bylaws) without
shareholder approval, enabling shareholders to place proposals for
governance changes on the company’s proxy statement, or encouraging the board to implement majority-passed shareholder proposals.
Other measures concerning the allocation of power between
shareholders and the board are those that provide shareholders with a
say on specific business decisions. For example, the so-called “say on
pay” arrangements, which were adopted by legislation in the United
108
Kingdom and Australia, as well as by some companies in the United
109
States, enable shareholders to express their views on the company’s
compensation policy. The same approach has been adopted in the
106

See Bebchuk, supra note 98, at 856-61 (explaining why the power to replace
management is insufficient to allow shareholders to have their wishes followed).
107
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1784 (2006) (proposing to allow shareholders to make rules-of-the-game decisions and
addressing counterarguments thereto); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws,
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 208 (2005)
(“[S]hareholder bylaws regulating corporate governance are desirable.”).
108
See Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 829 & n.66 (2008) (describing a reform, enacted in Australia and the United Kingdom and also recommended for the United States by the Paulson
Committee, granting shareholders an annual advisory vote on employee compensation).
109
See Claudia H. Deutsch, Say on Pay: A Whisper or a Shout for Shareholders?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at BU9 (“The votes on compensation may be nonbinding, but
they are still popular.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Verizon Shareholders To Vote on Pay for Top
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C8 (reporting Verizon’s decision to put its executive-compensation arrangements to a shareholder vote).
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United States by stock-exchange requirements that shareholders ap110
prove certain option plans. Finally, some measures empower shareholders to influence the composition of the board without a control
contest. This category includes majority voting (enabling shareholders to oppose the election of underperforming directors even though
111
there are no challengers on the ballot), shareholder access to the
ballot (empowering shareholders to use the company’s proxy state112
ment to nominate a small number of directors), and shareholder
power to determine the size of the board or to fill board vacancies.
Some opponents believe that such measures may adversely affect
113
outside investors in NCS companies. Yet there is no dispute that the
allocation of power between boards and shareholders can have a substantial impact (for better or worse) on outside investors in such companies. These arrangements are likely to significantly influence corporate decisions by affecting the extent to which directors and officers
are attuned to the preferences of the majority of shareholders.
In CS companies, in contrast, such arrangements are unlikely to
have significant consequences. Given their ability to elect directors,
controllers can usually have boards follow their preferences even without the measures designed to enable dispersed shareholders to overcome their collective action problems. Consider, for example, shareholders’ rights to have their governance proposals or board nominees
appear on the company’s proxy materials for a shareholder meeting.
Given the collective action problems that they face, dispersed share110

See Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48108, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995
( July 3, 2003) (requiring shareholder approval of all equity compensation plans and
material revisions thereto).
111
For a comprehensive analysis of majority voting and the legal issues that this
regime raises, see J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW.
1007 (2007).
112
See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 211-12 (reviewing recent efforts by institutional shareholders to propose bylaw amendments concerning director nomination).
113
See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 574 (2006) (arguing that increasing shareholder power might encourage
shareholders to advance what is in their own—not the company’s—best interests);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 (2006) (arguing that active shareholder involvement would
disrupt the centralization of decision-making authority in the board of directors); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764-66 (2006) (expanding
on the traditionalist view that the incentives of institutional investors differ significantly
from those of individual stockholders).
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holders may not engage in the costly process of soliciting proxies for
their proposal or board nominee, even when such a proposal is likely
to receive significant shareholder support. Controlling shareholders,
on the other hand, typically have no difficulty making the board include their proposals or nominees on the company’s ballot, and can
in any event bring the proposals that they favor to a vote at the shareholder meeting even if, for some reason, those proposals were not included in the company’s proxy materials.
Similarly, even without formal requirements of shareholder approval or advisory vote, directors in CS companies are unlikely to decide important issues, such as the CEO’s compensation package, without getting the controller’s implicit or explicit consent or at least a
sense of the controller’s views on the matter. Likewise, even without
formal requirements to give weight to shareholder preferences expressed in a nonbinding proposal, a board effectively elected by a controlling shareholder is unlikely to disregard such shareholder’s preferences (or at least those preferences that the controller chooses to
114
express).
Most importantly, whereas making directors follow the preferences of the majority of shareholders may enhance the protection of
outside investors in NCS companies, it cannot be expected to do so in
CS companies. In CS companies, outside investors’ main concern is
not that management will make decisions that diverge from the interests of the majority of the shareholders, but rather that management
will make decisions that divert value from outside investors to the controlling shareholder. Given the nature of the agency problem in CS
companies, measures that increase the board’s adherence to the majority shareholder’s preferences would exacerbate—rather than alleviate—the risk of controller opportunism. Thus, in CS companies, giving the majority of shareholders more power vis-à-vis the board would
operate to weaken—not enhance—the protection of outside investors.
The measures that we considered earlier in this Section therefore
cannot improve the protection of minority shareholders in CS companies. Indeed, they might even undermine it. By contrast, measures
that insulate the board of an NCS company from following the preferences of the majority of shareholders might actually enable the board
114

In some rare cases, a conflict may arise between the board and controlling
shareholders. See Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1088-89 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(approving board action to install a poison pill in order to prevent the controlling
shareholder—who was suspected of fraud—from selling its control block), aff’d, 872
A.2d 559 (Del. 2005).
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of a CS company to counterbalance the controller’s power and even
115
constrain controller opportunism.
2. Treatment by Governance Standards
We now examine how the leading governance metrics treat measures that increase the power of the majority of shareholders to influence corporate decision making. The CGQ system grades positively
the presence of four arrangements concerning shareholder power:
requiring that shareholders annually ratify management’s selection of
116
an auditor, requiring that shareholders vote on new poison pills and
117
material amendments to existing ones, requiring shareholder ap118
proval for any bylaw amendments, and requiring responsiveness to
119
shareholder proposals passed with majority support.
Although such measures may benefit outside investors in NCS
companies, they are likely to have little practical relevance for CS
companies. Consider the provisions calling for shareholders to ratify
the choice of auditors or board actions to amend the bylaws. Even
when directors of a CS company have the formal power to select auditors or amend the bylaws without shareholder approval, they are
unlikely to make decisions in these matters that are opposed by the
120
Furthermore, even assuming that formal approval recontroller.
quirements would provide the controller with more power over auditor

115

This might be especially true for arrangements that make it difficult for a controller to fire directors quickly. While they might lead to entrenchment and exacerbate the problem of insider opportunism in an NCS company, measures that make it
difficult for the majority of shareholders to fire the board might provide the board in a
CS company with some independence from the controller.
116
See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶ 21, at 13
(“Shareholders should be permitted to ratify management’s selection of auditors each
year.”).
117
See id. ¶ 22, at 13 (“Shareholders should be permitted to approve shareholder
rights plans (i.e., poison pills).”).
118
See id. ¶ 32, at 17 (“Management should not be permitted to amend the bylaws
without shareholder approval.”).
119
See id. ¶ 14, at 10 (“Management should take action on all shareholder proposals supported by a majority vote within 12 months of the shareholders’ meeting.”).
Though the standard calls on the board to take action within twelve months, the action
does not have to be implementation. Either partial implementation or issuance of an
analysis explaining why the board does not implement seems to be within the takeaction standard. What the standard opposes is just ignoring the passed proposal.
120
We should note, however, that there are rare cases in which boards decide to
take active steps against controlling shareholders. See supra note 114.
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selection or bylaw amendments, it is doubtful that such a change
would enhance the protection of outside investors.
The CGQ rating system also grades positively several provisions
that strengthen the ability of the majority of shareholders to determine
who will serve on the board. These provisions include annual board
121
122
elections, shareholder approval for changes in board size, share123
holder power to fill board vacancies, shareholder power to act by
124
125
written consent, and shareholder power to call a special meeting.
These provisions—which we discussed earlier as facilitating control
contests—also enhance shareholder influence over board composition
in the absence of a control contest. Thus, they increase the extent to
which directors are accountable to the majority of shareholders. But
even though making directors more accountable to the majority of
shareholders may constrain management’s opportunism in NCS companies, it cannot address controller opportunism in CS companies,
and it may even undermine the ability and willingness of directors in
such companies to serve as a check on the controller.
One of the six key provisions of the Anti-Director Rights Index focuses on shareholder power to call a special meeting. This power enhances the ability of the majority of shareholders to have their preferences followed. But having the power to call a special meeting does
not materially affect the balance of power in CS companies. The fact
that the Anti-Director Rights Index gives significant weight to the
presence of an arrangement that is largely inconsequential for outside
investors in CS companies undermines the index’s effectiveness as an
accurate measure of investor protection in countries where such companies dominate.

121

See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶ 5, at 7
(“Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an annual basis.”).
122
See id. ¶ 7, at 7 (“Shareholders have the right to vote on changes to expand or
contract the size of the board.”).
123
See id. ¶ 16, at 10-11 (“Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote on
all directors selected to fill vacancies.”).
124
See id. ¶ 30, at 16 (“Shareholders should be permitted to act by written consent.”).
125
See id. ¶ 31, at 16-17 (“Shareholders should be permitted to call special
meetings.”).
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E. Allocation of Power Between the Majority and the Minority
1. The Difference Between NCS and CS Companies
We have thus far assumed that empowering shareholders as a
group to make a decision means that a majority of shareholders will
have the effective power to make the decision. But whether the majority of shareholders can exercise the power held by shareholders
generally depends on the governance arrangements in place. Corporate law or the company’s governance arrangements can limit the
majority’s ability to exercise shareholder voting power and can empower the minority to make certain decisions or exercise veto power
over others. A corporate action may require supermajority approval,
for example, or even approval by a majority of the minority
shareholders. We will refer to any arrangement that prevents the
majority from exercising the full power that shareholders acting unanimously would wield as an arrangement that empowers minority
shareholders.
The impact of measures that limit the power of the majority of
shareholders depends on the company’s ownership structure. This
variance is again due to the fundamental difference between CS and
NCS companies with respect to the agency problems that confront
outside investors. In NCS companies, because the main agency problem is opportunism on the part of management, and because shareholders face collective action problems, arrangements that make it
difficult for the majority to act may undermine shareholders’ ability to
constrain insider opportunism.
In contrast, in CS companies, making it easier for the majority of
shareholders to have its way cannot alleviate, and may exacerbate, the
key concern of controller opportunism. Indeed, one strategy for addressing this agency problem is constraining the voting power of the
majority of shareholders or empowering minority shareholders as a
group to influence certain decisions. Delaware case law, for example,
encourages controllers to subject self-dealing transactions to a majority126
of-minority vote. And some jurisdictions condition self-dealing trans127
actions on the approval of a majority of disinterested shareholders.

126

Specifically, a majority-of-minority requirement shifts the burden to the minority to show that the transaction is unfair. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d
1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“[A]n approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of
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2. Treatment by Governance Standards
The CGQ system disfavors two arrangements that require supermajority approval for fundamental changes: the supermajority voting
requirement for mergers and the supermajority requirement for char128
This negative treatment of supermajority voting
ter amendments.
arrangements may be sensible for NCS companies, and its presence
may reflect the NCS mindset of those designing the CGQ system. In
NCS companies, supermajority requirements can insulate the board
from shareholder intervention and serve as an antitakeover device.
Indeed, a study coauthored by one of us that focused on NCS companies in the U.S. market finds that such supermajority requirements are
129
negatively correlated with firm value.
Supermajority voting arrangements are likely to have different effects in CS companies, however. When the company has a controlling
shareholder, these arrangements limit the controller’s ability to pass

proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the
challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”).
127
See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY HANDBOOK § 11.1.7(4) (2007), available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/handbook/LR/11/1.pdf (requiring companies listed
on the London Stock Exchange to ensure that the related party does not vote on the
resolution and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the related party’s associates do
not vote); Pierre-Henri Conac et al., Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The
Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy 10-12 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 88/2007, 2007) (describing how the legal systems in France, Italy,
and Germany regulate self-dealing transactions and noting that in France self-dealing
transactions require an ex ante approval by the board of directors and ratification at
the annual shareholder meeting). But see Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party
Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 11, at 101, 122 (noting
that the requirement for a minority vote on controller transactions has not been
adopted by most major jurisdictions).
128
See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶¶ 28–29, at
15-16 (“A simple majority vote should be required to amend the charter/bylaws and to
approve mergers or business combinations.”). Note that we do not consider here the
optimal scope of minority empowerment—that is, what issues should be left for the
minority to vote on. Rather, we claim that empowering shareholders as a group to vote
cannot enhance minority protection in CS companies.
129
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 784-85 (finding a negative correlation between these arrangements and firms’ Tobin Q ). This study thus included these arrangements in its entrenchment index, which subsequent researchers have used as a
measure of corporate governance. See, e.g., Amy Dittmar & Jan Mahrt-Smith, Corporate
Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 599, 603 (2007) (using degree of managerial entrenchment caused by takeover defenses and large-shareholder
monitoring as measures of corporate governance).
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resolutions, thereby empowering minority shareholders and poten130
tially limiting controller opportunism.
The Anti-Director Rights Index does not include provisions for
supermajority voting or similar arrangements that empower minority
shareholders. The Anti-Self-Dealing Index, however, does take into
account one type of minority-empowering provision—a requirement
that related-party transactions be approved by a majority of “disinter131
Such majority-of-the-minority votes, which are
ested” shareholders.
not given weight in the CGQ system, should be taken into account in
assessing investor protection in CS companies. Such requirements,
however, are not practically relevant to the protection of outside investors in NCS companies.
The arrangements that we have thus far discussed concern decisions that are not “divisible”—that is, either the majority or the minority of the shareholders will have its way. With respect to director elections, however, some arrangements provide minority shareholders
with partial power, enabling these shareholders to influence the selection of some—but not all—directors. Cumulative voting, for example,
enables minority shareholders to elect some directors even against the
132
controller’s wishes. Both the CGQ and the Anti-Director Rights In133
dex treat cumulative-voting arrangements favorably.

130

Supermajority voting requirements will fail to protect the minority when the
controller has enough voting power to overcome even the supermajority requirement.
For example, a requirement for a seventy percent vote would not contain controllers
holding eighty percent of the voting power.
131
See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 434 tbl.1.
132
Cf. BERNARD BLACK ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KOREA AT THE MILLENNIUM: ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: FINAL REPORT AND LEGAL
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(2000), reprinted in 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 564-65 (2001) (recommending that Korea
strengthen cumulative voting to protect minority shareholders); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1947-49
(1996) (describing the virtues of cumulative voting as including enhancing shareholder access to company information, increasing the independence of directors from
managers, and supporting the idea that directors have a primary duty to shareholders
and not to officers); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 127-28 (1994) (arguing that large institutional shareholders should advocate cumulative-voting systems and suggesting that
cumulative-voting systems improve corporate governance and benefit overall shareholder welfare).
133
See RISKMETRICS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 42, ¶ 8, at 8 (“Shareholders
should have the right to cumulate their votes for directors.”); supra text accompanying
note 52.
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Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of cumulative voting
in CS and NCS companies is outside the scope of this Article. For our
purposes, what is most important is that the impact of cumulative voting on investor protection could well depend on ownership structure.
Cumulative voting, we suggest, is more important for investor protection in CS companies than in NCS companies.
In an NCS company, a challenger enjoying the support of a majority of the outside shareholders will be able to get board seats (indeed,
all the board seats up for election), even under the winner-takes-all
system of elections. Moreover, in an NCS firm, cumulative voting may
impede a challenger’s ability to quickly replace the incumbent board
by giving minority shareholders (who may be aligned with the incumbents) the ability to elect some board members. In contrast, in a CS
company, a challenger enjoying the support of minority shareholders
will not be able to get any board seats without cumulative voting.
Thus, even if one takes the view that cumulative voting is desirable in
both CS and NCS companies, its value, and thus the weight given to its
presence, should differ between CS and NCS companies.
F. Director Independence
1. The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
Legal systems around the world increasingly require boards to
134
These indehave a significant number of independent directors.
pendent directors are often assigned the task of deciding matters that
raise potential conflicts of interest between corporate insiders and
135
outside investors.
Independent directors may be less willing to go along with insider
opportunism in both CS and NCS firms. Indeed, a growing body of
empirical research shows that independent directors who serve on the

134

For a comprehensive analysis of director independence in U.S. firms, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
135
On the role of independent directors in Britain and Japan, see Donald C.
Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 99-102 (2007).
For a review of the statutory requirements for independent directors in China, see
Chao Xi, In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms and the Political
Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 3-9 (2006).
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board or on certain key committees could enhance investor protection
136
even in countries where concentrated ownership is prevalent.
But even though independent directors may improve governance
at both NCS and CS companies, assessing director independence
should proceed differently in these two types of companies. The critical question is from whom should directors be independent? In NCS
companies, the principal concern is managerial opportunism, so it is
important to ensure directors’ independence from the company and
its management. Indeed, a director affiliated with a significant outside blockholder may be especially likely to act independently of management, because such a director may have stronger incentives to enhance share value by monitoring management effectively and
constraining insider opportunism.
In contrast, the principal concern in CS companies is controller
opportunism, so assessment of their governance should focus on director independence from the controller. Ties between directors and
the controller (or entities affiliated with it) may make the directors
less effective in limiting controller opportunism.
To be sure, under the assumption that the controlling shareholder dominates the company, a director’s close ties with the company would normally imply her lack of independence from the controller as well. But the opposite does not hold: independence from
the company does not necessarily imply independence from the controller. Seemingly independent directors may depend, for example,
on another business controlled by the company’s controlling shareholder. In sum, when one evaluates the governance of CS companies,
significant weight should be given to director independence from (or
dependence on) the controlling shareholder.
2. Treatment by Governance Standards
Both the Anti-Director Rights Index and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index give no weight to director independence, thus overlooking a factor that is relevant for both CS and NCS companies. In contrast, the

136

See Black et al., supra note 2, at 407-10 (finding that, even in developing countries with emerging markets, there is a strong connection between board independence and market value); Jay Dahya et al., supra note 46, at 96 (conducting a study of
firms in twenty-two countries and concluding that a dominant shareholder in a country
that provides little legal protection for shareholders can increase the market value of a
firm by electing independent directors).
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CGQ rating system does attach significant weight to the presence of
independent directors and their decision-making role.
The CGQ system grades boards with at least a two-thirds membership of independent directors and boards with nominating, compensation, and governance committees consisting solely of independent di137
rectors.
In evaluating director independence, however, the CGQ
rating system focuses almost exclusively on ties between directors and
the firm on the board of which they serve. In discussing director independence for purposes of the CGQ rating system, RiskMetrics notes directors’ “adequate independence from management” but does not ex138
plicitly refer to director independence from controlling shareholders.
RiskMetrics also provides various measures of independence that
seek to cover a range of possible links between a director and the company, but it does not cover to the same extent the possible relation139
Under
ships between a director and a controlling shareholder.
RiskMetrics’s definition of independence, for example, a company
employee would likely be defined as an “inside director,” but an employee of another company that the controller owns would not be so
140
defined. Given the prevalence of business groups around the world,
this failure to take into account directors who depend on other firms
controlled by the company’s controlling shareholder is problematic.
Similarly, under RiskMetrics’s definition of independence, a controller sitting on the board would be defined as an inside director if she
has more than fifty percent of voting power but not, for example, if
141
she has forty-five percent of voting power.
Several other components of the CGQ system reinforce the impression that its designers were mostly concerned with director independence from management, not controlling shareholders. The
CGQ system includes several provisions that address the relationship
between the board and the CEO: former CEOs are discouraged from
serving on the board; the positions of CEO and board chair should be

137

RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶¶ 1–4, at 4-6.
Note that neither the Anti-Director Rights Index nor the Anti-Self-Dealing Index lists
director independence as one of the criteria for evaluating investor protection. These
indices thus assign no weight to a factor that, albeit in different ways, could be useful
for both CS and NCS companies.
138
Id. ¶ 1, at 4-5.
139
Id. (designating three categories of directors—inside, affiliated, and independent—and emphasizing the need for board independence from management).
140
Id.
141
Id.
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separated; and directors are encouraged to meet without the CEO
142
present. The view underlying these provisions is that the CEO is the
143
But
key, powerful insider who needs to be monitored by directors.
the situation in CS companies run by professional managers is often
144
different. In such companies, the key, powerful figure whose opportunism needs to be constrained may well be the controller. Where
this is the case, it is unlikely that having CEO-chair separation with the
controller serving as the chair will enhance the protection of outside
investors.
G. Arrangement Governing Potential Value Diversion
1. The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
An important set of governance arrangements directly regulates
actions and transactions that might divert value from outside investors
to corporate insiders. As we explained earlier, controlling shareholders may divert value from outside investors by using channels different
from those through which NCS company insiders might attempt to do
so. Accordingly, limiting insider-value diversion effectively may require different sets of arrangements in NCS and CS companies.
Specifically, assessing the governance of CS companies requires
close attention to the arrangements governing freezeouts, relatedparty transactions with the controller or entities affiliated with it, and
145
taking corporate opportunities. These types of actions are relatively
less important in NCS companies, as professional managers commonly have fewer opportunities to engage in related-party transac146
In contions or to take corporate opportunities on a large scale.
trast, an assessment of the governance of NCS companies should
142

Id. ¶¶ 11–12, at 53.
See Gordon, supra note 134, at 1472 (“[A]n increasingly important element of
the independent board’s monitoring role came to be the appropriate use of market
signals . . . in CEO termination decisions.”).
144
A “professional CEO” connotes a CEO who is neither the controlling shareholder nor related in any meaningful way to the controlling shareholder.
145
Establishing a case against controlling shareholders for taking corporate opportunities might be a complicated task, especially when the controller is another corporation that operates within the same industry. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (finding that an international oil company did not
usurp corporate opportunities that belonged to its Venezuelan subsidiary).
146
Management can also divert value from shareholders by buying a public company from its outside investors and taking it private in a management buyout. See generally Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985).
143
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assign an increased weight to the arrangements governing executive
147
compensation.
2. Treatment by Governance Standards
Beginning with the modes of value diversion that are relatively
more important for NCS companies, we should note that more than
ten components of the CGQ system—almost one-fifth of all the components—deal with executive compensation and stock ownership by
148
Although this approach may be appropriate
directors and officers.
for NCS companies, where executive compensation is a central issue,
it is inappropriate for CS companies, where concerns about value diversion through executive compensation typically do not occupy such
a central role. It is especially inappropriate in CS companies with a
professional manager who is not affiliated with the controller, where
one can expect the controller to monitor executive pay and constrain
excessive pay arrangements.
Turning to CS companies, it is important to note that the CGQ
system assigns little weight to the regulation of freezeouts and relatedparty transactions involving controlling shareholders. The non-U.S.
system has only one provision related to this important set of insider
149
actions, and it applies only to transactions involving the CEO. In CS
companies, however, the related-party transactions that deserve most
attention are those involving the controller (directly or indirectly).
Furthermore, the CGQ system’s provisions do not focus on the
scope of related-party transactions. The provisions presumably reflect
the view that the sheer existence of such transactions is a sign of governance problems. But in many CS companies, especially those that
are part of a business group or a holding company structure, some related-party transactions are common, and the mere existence of such
transactions is not an important signal of governance failures. What is
important for assessing the quality of governance in such companies is
the scope of self-dealing transactions and the mechanisms for monitoring them. These considerations further reinforce the conclusion
that the CGQ system does not provide a good measure of governance
problems in CS companies.

147

When the controller is hired by the firm, her executive compensation could be
classified as controller self-dealing.
148
RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶¶ 3, 35–44, at
6, 19-23.
149
Id. ¶ 17, at 11.
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In contrast, the Anti-Director Rights Index and the Anti-SelfDealing Index do pay significant attention to potential value diversion
by controllers, but they pay little attention to executive compensation.
One of the six key components of the Anti-Director Rights Index concerns oppressed-minorities mechanisms, broadly defined to include
measures that grant minority shareholders rights either to challenge
controller opportunism in court or to have their shares redeemed in
150
the presence of such opportunism. The Anti-Self-Dealing Index, in
turn, focuses exclusively and in detail on measures that regulate re151
lated-party transactions. Thus, these two indices, and especially the
Anti-Self-Dealing Index, pay close attention to value-diversion chan152
nels that are important for CS companies, but they tend to overlook
executive-compensation issues that are relatively important for NCS
companies.
This conclusion is especially strong in the case of the Anti-SelfDealing Index. This index focuses on the regulation of a paradigmatic related-party transaction between a public company and a private company owned by the public company’s controlling sharehold153
ers. The constraints on such a transaction might well be vital for CS
companies, but they are far less important for assessing governance at
NCS companies. Thus, although the index was intended to serve, and
has been used, as a metric for investor protection around the world,
its design renders it ineffective as a measure of the quality of investor
protection in NCS companies.
III. GOING FORWARD
As we stressed at the outset, we do not wish to undermine the important project of developing objective metrics for measuring the
quality of corporate governance around the world; we would like to
see the project pursued more effectively, not abandoned. Nor do we
wish to limit ourselves to pointing out the shortcomings in past work

150

La Porta et al., supra note 13, at 1122 tbl.1.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
152
We should note here that, although the title of this provision refers to “minority oppression,” its definition is so broad that it could perhaps also include remedies
that would be available for shareholders at NCS companies. See Spamann, supra note
14, at 9 (referring to this provision as being “extremely broad”).
153
See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 432-33 (setting forth an example of a stylized self-dealing transaction and using the Anti-Self-Dealing Index to measure whether
a hypothetical controlling shareholder will be able to get away with the transaction).
151
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by academics and practitioners; rather, we seek to identify ways to improve the development of governance metrics.
In Section A, we discuss the proper approach for evaluating companies’ governance arrangements. In Section B, we consider the desirable approach for assessing countries and legal systems.
A. Evaluating Companies
Our thesis is that different sets of standards should be used to
evaluate the governance of CS and NCS companies. In this Section,
we outline several key elements of these separate rating systems.
We fully recognize that, as noted in the Introduction, some companies belong to a gray area and cannot be easily classified as CS or
NCS. These are companies in which a shareholder has a block large
enough to make control difficult to contest but not large enough to
make control de facto uncontestable. For these companies, it would
be necessary to appropriately combine elements of the two rating systems that we discuss below. We defer this additional task to another
day and focus instead on the more fundamental task: putting forward
standards for assessing corporate governance at the large number of
public companies that can easily be classified as either a CS or an NCS
154
company.
We begin by outlining the basic elements necessary for assessing
corporate governance at NCS firms and then discuss the necessary
elements for assessing CS firms. We do not purport to provide a complete and fully detailed account of the two evaluation systems. Rather,
we identify the type of governance arrangements on which each
evaluation system should focus.

154

Another complication arises because a company may change from one type to
another over time. Thus, an NCS company might turn into a CS company if a majority
of shareholders accepts a tender offer for its shares. When a controlling shareholder
emerges, the company’s governance and the value of minority shares will have to be
assessed according to the CS standard. Thus, shareholders trying to estimate the value
of minority shares in the event of a takeover would do well to use a CS standard rather
than the NCS standard applicable to the company pretakeover. Governance arrangements can also affect the transition from one ownership structure to another. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=203110. Finally, governance arrangements such as supermajority
vote requirements also can affect the percentage ownership that would allow a shareholder to become a controlling shareholder.
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1. NCS Companies
a. Control Contests
As we explained earlier, an active market for corporate control
has an important effect on management of NCS companies. Any system for assessing the corporate governance of NCS companies should
thus assign substantial weight to the arrangements governing hostile
takeovers and proxy fights, even though scholars and practitioners
may differ in their views on which arrangements concerning such control contests are optimal.
b. Shareholder Voting Procedures
In NCS companies, shareholder voting power is one of the primary mechanisms for aligning the interests of directors and officers
with those of shareholders. The extent to which shareholders’ voting
power is not only formal but also effective depends on the detailed set
of procedures that governs shareholder voting. A system for evaluating corporate governance at NCS companies should thus give significant weight to the existence of arrangements that facilitate the ability
of a majority of shareholders to express its will on certain key issues
through voting. Thus, among other things, governance evaluation at
NCS companies should give weight to arrangements such as shareholder ability to (1) vote by mail, proxy, or written consent, (2) vote
without depositing shares, (3) place governance proposals and board
nominees on the company’s ballot, and (4) be protected by confidential voting.
c. Allocation of Power Between the Board and Shareholders
In addition to voting procedures, governance in NCS companies
depends significantly on the scope of shareholders’ voting power—or
what shareholders can vote on. A system for evaluating corporate
governance at these companies should therefore take into account
such issues as shareholders’ effective power to initiate governance
changes, as well as the existence of requirements for a shareholder
vote on fundamental transactions, firm-governance arrangements,
and manager-compensation packages. Again, there may be room for
reasonable disagreement about the most desirable allocation of power
between shareholders and the board. But there is a good basis for
agreement that the nature of the arrangements governing such allocation should be given weight in assessing the governance of NCS firms.
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d. Executive Compensation
Suboptimal compensation arrangements can be a main channel
for insider opportunism at NCS companies. Therefore, a system of
governance assessment for these companies should consider the extent to which compensation arrangements are consistent with the goal
of enhancing firm value. The assessment could include not only the
substantive aspects of compensation arrangements but also the process for setting executive-pay schemes—for example, the composition
of the compensation committee, the committee’s decision-making
process, and the requirements (if any) for shareholder ratification of
option plans or other pay package components. And while any
evaluation of governance in NCS companies should pay some attention to the arrangements governing self-dealing transactions with officers and directors, the weight given to self-dealing should be less than
that accorded in a system that evaluates governance in CS companies.
e. Director Independence
Director independence can enhance the protection of outside investors at both CS and NCS companies. A company’s ownership structure, however, determines the type of relationships that should be considered when assessing director independence. In NCS companies,
that assessment should focus on the ties between directors and management, and (assuming management’s control over the company) the
ties between directors and the company on whose board they serve. In
contrast, ties between directors and outside blockholders who are not
themselves tied to management might be beneficial, making directors
more attentive to, and focused on, shareholder interests.
2. CS Companies
a. Allocation of Power Between the Majority and the Minority
In CS companies, the distribution of power among shareholders is
important. Is the majority able to wield all the power reserved for
shareholders, or does the minority have a say? One important way to
protect outside investors at CS companies is to empower minority
shareholders to block certain corporate transactions and other actions. In particular, such power might be desirable when the interests
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of the controller and minority outside investors diverge.
A system
for rating corporate governance at CS firms should thus pay attention
to arrangements that empower minority shareholders (or limit the
power of the majority shareholders) with respect to certain decisions—for example, the extent to which minority shareholders are in
a position to block related-party transactions between the controller
and the company. In addition, assessments of governance in CS companies should take into account the existence of arrangements, such
as cumulative voting, that provide minority shareholders with the ability to influence board composition.
b. Self-Dealing and Freezeouts
In CS companies, self-dealing transactions that involve controlling
shareholders or their affiliates provide a principal channel for diverting value from the firm and its outside shareholders. The risk of value
diversion through self-dealing is exacerbated when dominant families
control a relatively large number of public companies through pyramids and other similar structures. To be sure, the quality of the
mechanisms that govern self-dealing should not serve as the exclusive
156
metric for evaluating corporate governance at CS companies. Yet a
system for evaluating corporate governance at such firms should assign considerable weight to the mechanisms—such as disclosure, voting requirements, and fiduciary duties—that govern self-dealing
transactions in general and “going private” freezeouts in particular.
Moreover, the relative weight of these mechanisms when assessing the
overall governance of CS firms should be significantly higher than
157
their weight when assessing the governance of NCS firms.

155

In NCS firms, in contrast, arrangements that require more than a standard majority vote would tend to protect managers, undermine their accountability to the majority of shareholders, and even discourage hostile takeovers. A system for evaluating
governance at NCS firms should thus treat negatively any supermajority voting requirements.
156
As we explained earlier, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index focuses exclusively on
measures for regulating controlling shareholders’ self-dealing transactions. See supra
subsection I.C.2.
157
Other types of arrangements that should be evaluated in CS firms are those
that prevent controllers from selling their control block when the sale would likely increase the diversion of value from the firm to the new controller. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1473
(1992) (“[C]ourts have sometimes held controlling shareholders liable when a control
transaction effectively ‘diverts’ a corporate or collective opportunity.”).
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c. Director Independence
As stressed earlier, independent directors can enhance investor
protection in both CS and NCS companies. In CS companies, however, directors can be genuinely independent only when they have no
ties to the controlling shareholder or its affiliates. Thus, an assessment of director independence that focuses only on ties between directors and the company on the board of which they serve may miss
the mark. Moreover, in evaluating director independence at CS companies, one should also consider the extent to which the controller
can influence the process of nominating and electing independent
directors. Relatedly, CS companies should get little credit, if any, for
having directors meet for “executive” sessions in which management is
not present but the controller or its representative is.
d. Control Contests
Because control in CS companies is not contestable, any assessment that credits CS companies for the presence of arrangements facilitating control contests would introduce substantial noise and might
make overall governance scores less accurate and informative. The
absence or unavailability of a poison pill, for example, has virtually no
impact on the likelihood of a hostile takeover in a company with a majority shareholder. A system for rating CS companies should therefore
not include elements based on the presence of arrangements that fa158
cilitate or impede hostile bids and proxy contests.
e. Shareholder Voting Procedures
The procedures governing shareholder voting are substantially
less important for CS than for NCS companies. To be sure, there is
no good reason why even CS companies should have procedures that
impede, discourage, or distort voting by outside shareholders. Given
the ability of a controller to determine the outcome of votes, however,
the absence of such procedures does not necessarily improve the protection of outside investors in CS companies. Thus, any methodology
for assessing governance in CS companies should generally assign little weight (if any) to arrangements governing voting procedures, such
as shareholder ability to vote by mail, proxy, or written consent; share158

The presence of such arrangements—and especially those included in the bylaws or charter—might have some indirect impact to the extent that a CS firm might
become an NCS firm in the future.
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holder right to vote without depositing shares and by secret ballot;
and shareholder ability to place proposals on the company’s proxy
statement.
The discussion above focuses on matters subject to a majority-vote
rule. As we explained earlier, however, shareholder voting can play a
valuable role in enhancing minority protection at CS companies when
the requirement for shareholder approval is combined with measures
to empower the minority, such as majority-of-minority voting requirements. In the case of such votes, procedures that facilitate undistorted voting by minority shareholders may well be consequential, and
their presence or absence should be duly taken into account when
evaluating governance.
f. Allocation of Power Between Boards and Shareholders
In CS companies, measures that expand the scope of issues on
which shareholders can vote or strengthen the ability of the majority
of shareholders to influence board decisions would be unlikely to enhance the protection of outside investors. Indeed, as we explained
earlier, measures that insulate directors from the controller—for example, making it difficult to fire directors—may sometimes enhance
the protection of minority shareholders at CS companies. It follows
that a system for evaluating governance in CS companies should not
give significant positive weight to the presence of arrangements, such
as requirements for a shareholder ratification of auditor selection or
shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation, that expand
the formal scope of shareholder voting power.
g. Executive Compensation
As explained earlier, even though excessive-compensation arrangements could be an issue in CS companies, they are probably less
159
important in such companies than in NCS companies. Accordingly,
in evaluating corporate governance, the substantive and procedural
limitations on executive compensation should occupy a less central
role in CS companies than in NCS companies.

159

See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 (noting a controller’s interest in
maximizing shareholder value).
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h. Controlling Minority Shareholders
Controlling shareholders may use arrangements such as pyramids,
dual-class shares, and other mechanisms to separate cash-flow and vot160
ing rights. When such arrangements are in place, the controller can
have an absolute lock on control even though it has less—and sometimes substantially less—than half of the company’s cash flows. Other
things being equal, the interests of the so-called controlling minority
shareholders overlap with those of outside investors to a lesser degree
161
than do the interests of a controlling majority shareholder. As a result, concerns about insider opportunism should increase when control is locked in the hands of controlling minority shareholders. Indeed, evidence indicates that firm value decreases as the difference
162
between equity ownership and voting control increases. A system of
governance assessment at CS companies should thus take into account
the presence of controlling minority shareholders and the degree to
which voting rights and cash-flow rights are separated.
B. Evaluating Legal Systems
Our analysis has thus far focused on the appropriate approach for
comparing the quality of corporate governance across firms. But another important task for academics, investors, and policymakers is to
evaluate the extent to which countries differ in terms of the level of
protection that they provide—through their legal rules and institutional arrangements—to outside investors in their public firms.
Thus far, research conducting cross-country comparisons has generally been based on a single standard for measuring countries’ levels of
investor protection. To date, there have been more than one hundred
cross-country studies based on either the Anti-Director Rights Index or
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For an analysis of these devices and their corporate-governance implications,
see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity, in
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 86, at 295.
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The term “controlling minority” was introduced by Bebchuk et al., id. This
study shows that agency costs can be expected to increase, and to do so at an increasing rate, with declines in the fraction of cash-flow rights owned by the controlling minority shareholder.
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See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of
Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002); Paul Gompers et. al., Extreme Governance: An
Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United States (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 12-04, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=562511.
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the Anti-Self-Dealing Index.
As in the case of companies, however,
our analysis suggests that the use of a single metric is inappropriate.
Because many rules and arrangements have different effects on investor protection in CS and NCS companies, a given country may provide outside investors in CS and NCS companies with different levels of
protection. For example, one country may do much better than others
in protecting outside investors in NCS companies but do a relatively
poor job of protecting them in CS companies. Researchers, investors,
and policymakers, we suggest, should not assign each country a single
score for its quality of investor protection, but rather two scores: one
for the quality of protection accorded to investors in NCS companies
(the country’s NCS score) and one for the quality of protection accorded to investors in CS companies (the country’s CS score).
At first glance, it might appear that assigning two different scores
should be only an intermediate step, followed by combining the two
into a single score representing the country’s overall quality of investor protection. One could, for example, simply average the country’s
NCS and CS scores. Such an approach, it might be argued, would
provide a single, easy-to-use metric for cross-country comparisons
while taking into account the relationship that we have analyzed between ownership structures and corporate governance. For many important purposes, however, keeping two separate scores and not combining them would be far more useful for researchers, investors, and
policymakers.
Consider first a researcher or policymaker who wants to know how
two countries compare in their overall level of investor protection.
The combined measure considered above could be misleading to the
extent that controlled and widely held structures are not equally represented in each country’s public equity market. For example, if most
of the countries’ companies have controlling shareholders, basing the
comparison on the countries’ CS scores would be more appropriate
than basing it on the countries’ combined CS and NCS scores. If NCS
companies dominate in both countries, basing the comparison on
NCS scores would be more appropriate. And if NCS companies
dominate in one country and CS companies dominate in the other,
then the comparison may be best when based on comparing the NCS
score of the first country with the CS score of the second.
Next, consider a researcher or an investor who is interested in
only a limited subset of particular companies. In this case, it would be
163

See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.

2009]

Global Governance Standards

1315

best to use the country’s CS score to examine companies that have a
controller and its NCS score to review companies that do not. Clearly,
even if NCS companies dominate in a country, using the country’s
NCS score to analyze investor protection in a set of CS companies
would be inferior to using the country’s CS score and vice versa. Accordingly, a researcher comparing firms from around the world and
seeking to control for the level of investor protection in each firm’s
country should use a country’s CS score as a control for a CS firm in
this country and the country’s NCS score as a control for an NCS firm
in this country.
Consider now researchers or policymakers seeking to improve a
country’s level of investor protection or to track improvements in this
level over time. As our discussion above indicates, looking separately
at each of the CS and NCS scores would commonly provide a better
picture than using a single, combined measure. For example, an increase in the country’s combined CS and NCS score would not represent a meaningful improvement to the extent that it resulted from an
increase in the country’s NCS score when most of the country’s public
companies have controlling shareholders.
Similarly, those interested in the political economy of investor
protection would do well to keep a country’s CS and NCS scores sepa164
Consider a researcher or a policymaker who is interested in
rate.
understanding the forces that produced a country’s current arrangements and identifying possible impediments to reform. The country’s
existing ownership structures determine what type of insiders—
controllers of CS companies or professional managers of NCS companies—wield more power in the country’s interest-group politics. Controllers and professional managers, in turn, do not focus on the same
corporate-governance issues.
In a country where CS companies dominate, the corporate insiders with the most political power—controlling shareholders—may well
care more about the country’s protection of outside investors at CS
165
firms than at NCS firms; they thus may be more open to reform that
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For a detailed analysis of the impact of political economy on corporate governance, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2009).
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Controlling shareholders may have substantial political power when they are
wealthy families that control a large number of public companies through pyramids.
See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth,
43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 655, 655 (2005) (arguing that disproportionate control of
large areas of an economy can result in “greatly amplified political influence”).
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will increase the country’s NCS score but not its CS score. Conversely,
in a country where NCS companies dominate, professional managers,
who wield significant political power, may well be more focused on
the country’s NCS score.
It is worth noting, however, that even though it might be easier
politically to adopt measures to improve the NCS score of a country in
which CS companies dominate, such a reform would be less useful for
the country’s overall investor protection and thus for the development
of its financial markets. Conversely, even though it might be more politically palatable to adopt reforms increasing the CS score in a country dominated by NCS companies, such reforms would have limited
consequences for the country’s overall investor protection. Clearly, it
is important to keep a country’s NCS and CS scores separate in order
to obtain a good understanding of all the forces shaping that nation’s
investor-protection system and impeding reforms in this area.
We conclude that researchers, shareholder advisers, and policymakers should not overlook the rich and useful information provided
by keeping separate scores for a country’s level of protection for investors in CS and NCS companies. Doing so is vital for assessing how well
the country’s system protects investors in particular companies or in
public companies generally, how this protection has evolved over
time, what forces have led to prevailing arrangements, and which reforms would be more or less difficult to obtain.
CONCLUSION
We have shown in this Article that any attempt to assess the governance of public firms around the world should depend critically on
ownership structure. Some arrangements that benefit outside investors in companies without a controlling shareholder are either practically irrelevant or even counterproductive in the presence of a controlling shareholder, and vice versa.
Because of this fundamental difference between companies with
and without a controlling shareholder, any governance-rating methodology that applies a single metric to companies or countries worldwide is bound to produce an inaccurate or even distorted picture. We
have demonstrated that this problem afflicts—and undermines the effectiveness of—the CGQ system and the Anti-Director Rights and the
Anti-Self-Dealing indices, the most influential and widely used global
governance metrics.
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Going forward, the quest to design a single, global rating methodology should be replaced by an effort to design two separate methodologies for assessing the governance of companies with and without a
controlling shareholder. We have identified in this Article the key
elements that should and should not be included in each of these
methodologies. When assessing an individual company, one should
use the rating methodology that fits the company's ownership structure. When assessing the quality of investor protection in a given
country, one should keep separate scores on how well the country
protects investors in companies with and without a controlling shareholder. We hope that our analysis will provide researchers, policymakers, and investors with a useful framework for evaluating and improving the governance of public companies around the world.

